Interactive impacts of overconfidence and fairness concern on supply chain performance

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ABSTRACT

For exploring the interactive impacts of overconfidence and fairness concern on optimal decisions of manufacturer and retailer, we establish Stackelberg models with these two behavioural preferences in a two-echelon supply chain, wherein retailer has two behavioural preferences. The optimal equilibrium results are compared in different scenarios, namely the retailer with no behavioural preference, with single-behavioural preference and with the two behavioural preferences. Although previous literatures have proven that overconfidence or fairness concern has a negative influence on retailer, we find that the retailer always benefits from these two behavioural preferences, whether it is retail price, sales effort or utility. This is because when the overconfident degree is within a reasonable range, overconfidence and fairness concern have a positive influence on retailer's decision-making, and when the overconfident degree is high, the fairness concern preference can suppress the adverse effects caused by overconfidence. Compared with the preference of fairness concern, the overconfident preference plays a leading role in supply chain performance, which mainly manifests in retailer's decisions, utility and manufacturer profit. Moreover, the wholesale price and profit of the rational manufacturer may become worsen due to the fairness concern of retailer.

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Interaktivni vplivi pretirane samozvesti in skrbi za pravičnost na uspešnost dobavne verige

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POVZETEK

Za raziskovanje interaktivnih vplivov pretirane samozvesti in skrbi za pravičnost na optimalne odločitve proizvajalca in trgovca vzpostavljamo Stackelbergove modele s tema dvema vedenjskima vzorcema v dvostopenjski dobavni verigi, pri čemer ima trgovec dva vedenjska vzorca. Rezultati optimalnega ravnotežja se primerjajo v različnih scenarijih, in sicer trgovec brez vedenjskih vzorcev, z enim vedenjskim vzorcem in z obema vedenjskima vzorcema. Čeprav so prejšnje raziskave pokazale, da pretirana samozvest ali skrb za pravičnost negativno vplivata na trgovca, ugotovimo, da ima trgovec od teh dveh vedenjskih vzorcev vedno koristi, ne glede na to, ali gre za maloprodajno ceno, prodajni napor ali uporabnost. To je zato, ker kadar je stopnja pretirane samozvesti v razumnem obsegu, pretirana samozvest in skrb za pravičnost pozitivno vplivata na odločanje trgovca, kadar pa je stopnja pretirane samozvesti visoka, lahko skrb za pravičnost zatre škodljive učinke, ki jih povzroči pretirana samozvest. V primerjavi z vedenjskim vzorcem skrbi za pravičnost ima vzorec pretirane samozvesti vodilno vlogo pri uspešnosti dobavne verige, kar se kaže predvsem v odločitvah trgovca, koristnosti in dobičku proizvajalca. Poleg tega se lahko veletrgovska cena in dobiček racionalnega proizvajalca znižata zaradi trgovčeve skrbi za pravičnost.

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PODATKI O ČLANKU

Ključne besede:

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Upravljanje dobavne verige;
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Pretirana samozvest;
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